|
As part of the RMA duties and responsibility, the MAAR conducts periodic safety assessments, now called safety oversights, to ensure that the RVSM implementation in the Asia Region continues to be safe. This includes the monitoring of non-compliant aircraft operating in the RVSM airspace. In this regard, the support of information from the States concerned is very important. The required information includes:
- RVSM approvals data - continuous update of RVSM approvals data for all aircraft operating in the RVSM airspace, including
- Granting of RVSM approval – Form F2 shall be completed and submitted to MAAR immediately by the State Authority (State of Registry) when the RVSM approval is granted to an aircraft intended to operate (or continue to operate) in the RVSM airspace.
- Withdrawal of RVSM approval – Form F3 shall be completed and submitted to MAAR immediately by the State Authority (State of Registry) when the RVSM approval of an operator/aircraft is withdrew.
- An annual snapshot of all RVSM approvals data, according to ICAO APANPIRG Conclusion 19/15 and Conclusion 20/22
Conclusion 19/15 – Enhanced communications between States and RVSM RMAs
That, noting the pending Annex 6 provisions for the global long term monitoring of airframes used in RVSM operations and the critical role of Asia/Pacific RVSM Regional Monitoring Agencies (RMAs) in monitoring the safety of RVSM operations, the Regional Office draw the attention of States to the Long Term Height Monitoring Actions promulgated by RASMAG. In particular, States are encouraged to immediately strengthen relationships with their respective RMAs to ensure that information in relation to RVSM approval status is continuously available to RMAs
Conclusion 20/22 - Provide Annual Update of RVSM Approvals to RMAs
That, in addition to the continuous update of RVSM Approvals data called for by Conclusion 19/15 and APANPIRG RMA requirements, States provide an update of RVSM Approvals data in conjunction with the annual December traffic sample data submission required by Conclusion 16/4
- Traffic Sample Data (TSD) – the TSD collected is for the busiest month of the year. In the case of the Asia Region, States concerned shall collect and submit (electronically) the TSD for the month of December every year using the provided TSD template, according to ICAO APANPIRG Conclusion 16/4
Conclusion 16/4 – Traffic Sample Data Collection
That, States be advised by the Regional Office that December every year had been adopted for the routine collection of 30 days of traffic sample data to satisfy airspace safety monitoring requirements.
- Large Height Deviation (LHD) reports – States concerned shall report the occurrence(s) of LHD to MAAR on a monthly basis using the LHD report template, including the nil report (report of no LHD occurrence).
"A RVSM large height deviation (LHD) is defined as any
vertical deviation of 90 metres/300 feet or more from the
flight level expected to be occupied by the flight"
The causes of these LHDs (see table below) are crucial for RMA to determine the remedial actions required to ensure continuous safety of the RVSM airspace. Therefore, states are encouraged to
give a description of large height deviation occurrences as detailed as possible.
|
A
|
Flight crew failing to climb/descend the aircraft as cleared
Example: Aircraft A was at FL300 and assigned FL360. A CLAM alert was seen as
the aircraft passed FL364. The Mode C level reached FL365 before descending
back to FL360.
|
|
B
|
Flight crew climbing/descending without ATC Clearance
Example: At 0648, Aircraft A reported leaving cruise level FL340. The last level
clearance was coincident with STAR issue at 0623, when the flight was instructed
to maintain FL340. ATC was applying vertical separation between Aircraft A and
two other flights. The timing of the descent was such that Aircraft A had become
clear of the first conflicting aircraft and there was sufficient time to apply positive
separation with the other.
|
|
C
|
Incorrect operation or interpretation of airborne equipment (e.g. incorrect operation of fully functional FMS, incorrect transcription of ATC clearance or re-clearance, flight plan followed rather than ATC clearance, original clearance followed instead of re-clearance etc)
Example: The aircraft was maintaining a flight level below the assigned altitude.
The altimeters had not been reset at transition. The FL assigned was 350. The
aircraft was maintaining FL346 for in excess of 4 minutes.
|
|
D
|
ATC system loop error; (e.g. ATC issues incorrect clearance or flight crew misunderstands clearance message. Includes situations where ATC delivery of
operational information, including as the result of hear back and/or read back
errors, is absent, delayed, incorrect or incomplete, and may result in a loss of
separation.)
Example: All communications between ATC and aircraft are by HF third party
voice relay. Aircraft 1 was maintaining FL360 and requested FL380. A clearance
to FL370 was issued, with an expectation for higher levels at a later point. A
clearance was then issued to Aircraft 2 to climb to FL390, this was correctly read
back by the HF operator, but was issued to Aircraft 1.
The error was detected when Aircraft 1 reported maintaining FL390.
|
|
E
|
Coordination errors in the ATC to ATC transfer or control responsibility as a result of human factors issues (e.g. late or non-existent coordination, incorrect time estimate/actual, flight level, ATS route etc not in accordance with agreed parameters)
Example 1: Sector A coordinated Aircraft 1 to Sector B at FL380. The aircraft was
actually at FL400.
Example 2: The Sector A controller received coordination on Aircraft 1 for
Waypoint X at FL370 from Sector B. At 0504 Aircraft 1 was at Waypoint X at
FL350 requesting FL370.
|
|
F
|
Coordination errors in the ATC to ATC transfer or control responsibility as a result of equipment outage or technical issues
Example: Controller in FIR A attempts to send AIDC message to coordinate
transfer of aircraft at FL320. Messaging unsuccessful and attempts to contact
adjacent FIR by telephone fail. Aircraft contacts adjacent FIR without coordination
being completed.
|
|
G
|
Deviation due to aircraft contingency event leading to sudden inability to maintain assigned flight level (e.g. pressurization failure, engine failure)
Example: Aircraft 1 descended from F400 to F300 with a pressurisation issue.
|
|
H
|
Deviation due to airborne equipment failure leading to unintentional or undetected change of flight level
Example: Aircraft 1 cruising at FL380. ATC receives alert indicating aircraft
climbing through FL383. Flight crew advises attempting to regain cleared level
with autopilot and navigation system failure.
|
|
I
|
Deviation due to turbulence or other weather related cause
Example: During the cruise at F400, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence,
resulting the aircraft descending 1,000 ft without a clearance.
|
|
J
|
Deviation due to TCAS resolution advisory, flight crew correctly following the resolution advisory
Example: Aircraft 1 was cruising at FL350. Flight crew received "Traffic Alert" fromTCAS and almost immediately after an "RA Climb" instruction. Flight crew responded and climbed Aircraft 1 to approx FL353 to comply with TCAS instruction. TCAS display indicated that opposite direction Aircraft 2 descended to approx FL345 and passed below Aircraft 1.
|
|
K
|
Deviation due to TCAS resolution advisory, flight crew incorrectly following the resolution advisory
|
|
L
|
An aircraft being provided with RVSM separation is not RVSM approved (e.g. flight plan indicating RVSM approval but aircraft not approved, ATC misinterpretation of flight plan)
Example 1: Original flight plan details submitted by FIR A for outbound leg showed
Aircraft 1 as negative RVSM. Subsequent flight plan submitted by FIR B showed Aircraft 1 as RVSM approved. FIR A controller checked with aircraft shortly after entering FIR A and pilot confirmed negative RVSM.
Example 2: Aircraft 2 cruising FL310 was handed off to the Sector X controller
who noticed the label of Aircraft 2 indicated RVSM approval. The Sector X
controller had controlled the aircraft the day before. It was then a non-RVSM
aircraft. The controller queried the status of Aircraft 2 with the pilot who advised
the aircraft was negative RVSM.
|
|
M
|
Other – this includes situations of flights operating (including climbing/descending) in airspace where flight crews are unable to establish normal air-ground communications with the responsible ATS unit.
Example: Aircraft 1 cruising at FL350. At time xxxx Aircraft 1 advised “Negative
RVSM” due equipment failure. At that time Aircraft 2 on converging reciprocal
track FL360 less than 10 minutes prior to time of passing.
|
Ref: APANPIRG/22, Bangkok, 5 to 9 September 2011
|